




DATA ETHICS


PROF. DR. FLORIAN STAHL

Overview – Data Ethics



“On the Internet Nobody Knows You’re a Dog” MANNHEIM BUSINESS SCHOOL

**Cartoon in the New
Yorker, July 5, 1993**



“On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.”

Fake Profiles

- **Fake Profiles/accounts** are on the rise
- Facebook already deleted nearly **1.3 billion fake accounts**
- “Anonymous” posting is **exploited**




The Internet as a “Crime-Free Zone”

- Hate speech
- Discrimination and Racism
- Crimes such as the denial of the Holocaust
- “Freedom of speech”?



Anonymous Transactions are Possible


Post anonymously



Pay anonymously



But Many Transactions Need ID



You must provide an **address** if **goods are to be shipped** to you.



You must provide your **name** for **travel bookings**.



You must reveal your **location** to get **cellular service**.



You must **disclose intimate details** of your **health** and lifestyle to get **effective medical care**.

Enough History Tells All




If we have a **log of all your web searches** over some period, we can form a very good **picture of who you are**, and quite likely **identify** you.



If we have a log of all your **credit card purchases** over some period, we can do the same.

AOL Search Log Release

Web-based mail service AOL released **3 months of search logs for 650,000 users** for **research purposes**. The New York Times journalists Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller were able to **use the data to identify several users**.



Thelma Arnold from Lilburn, GA

What Exactly Is Personally Identifying?

Given **zipcode, birth date, and sex**, about 87% of **Social Security Numbers** can be determined uniquely.

This is possible although that information is **not considered PII!**

Don't play loose with
PII! Personally Identifiable Information (PII):
Your name in conjunction with SSN, DOB, mother's maiden name, biometric data, medical and financial history or any information that is linkable to or uniquely identifies you.

Did you know? One lost laptop, one errant email, one unsecured file cabinet containing PII could result in potentially thousands of personnel having their personal data compromised.

Tighten up your PII handling procedures:

- Properly mark all documents/emails containing PII
- Maintain positive control of all PII
 - Encrypt all data at rest
 - Share only with those who have a need-to-know
 - Eliminate unnecessary PII collections
- Collect only absolutely necessary PII

Netflix Prize



Netflix offered a million dollars to the winning team that could **beat Netflix's own movie recommendation** algorithm by more than 10%.



Released a **data set** comprising **user ID, date, movie name, rating**.



"Completely de-identified"

NETFLIX

Netflix Prize

Home Rules Leaderboard Register Update Submit Download


Leaderboard

Display top 20 leaders.

Rank	Team Name	Best Score	% Improvement	Last Submit Time
1	The Ensemble	0.8553	10.10	2009-07-26 18:38:22
2	BellKor's Pragmatic Chaos	0.8554	10.09	2009-07-26 18:18:28
Grand Prize - RMSE <= 0.8563				
3	Grand Prize Team	0.8571	9.91	2009-07-24 13:07:49
4	Opera Solutions and Vandelay United	0.8573	9.89	2009-07-25 20:05:52
5	Vandelay Industries!	0.8579	9.83	2009-07-26 02:49:53
6	PragmaticTheory	0.8582	9.80	2009-07-12 15:09:53
7	BellKor in BigChaos	0.8590	9.71	2009-07-26 12:57:25
8	Dace	0.8603	9.58	2009-07-24 17:18:43
9	Opera Solutions	0.8611	9.49	2009-07-26 18:02:08
10	BellKor	0.8612	9.48	2009-07-26 17:19:11
11	BigChaos	0.8613	9.47	2009-06-23 23:06:52
12	Feeds2	0.8613	9.47	2009-07-24 20:06:46
Progress Prize 2008 - RMSE = 0.8616 - Winning Team: BellKor in BigChaos				
13	Xiangliang	0.8633	9.26	2009-07-21 02:04:40
14	Gravity	0.8634	9.25	2009-07-26 15:58:34
15	Ces	0.8642	9.17	2009-07-25 17:42:38
16	Invisible Ideas	0.8644	9.14	2009-07-20 03:26:12
17	Just a guy in a garage	0.8650	9.08	2009-07-22 14:10:42
18	Craig Carmichael	0.8656	9.02	2009-07-25 16:00:54
19	J Dennis Su	0.8658	9.00	2009-03-11 09:41:54
20	acmehill	0.8659	8.99	2009-04-16 06:29:35
Progress Prize 2007 - RMSE = 0.8712 - Winning Team: KorBell				



Many users had posted
movie reviews on IMDb...



...and at the same time they
had **rated movies on Netflix.**

By **date of review**, users could be **linked across the two systems**, even if they only reviewed a few movies on IMDb. Their Netflix movie choices could be used to **determine sexual orientation**, even if all their IMDb reviews revealed no such information.

Netflix Saga Conclusion



Netflix was **sued** by a lesbian mom, who had not (yet) come out, for “outing” her.



Case **settled** for \$9m after 2+ years of litigation.



Netflix **canceled plans** for **additional rounds** of its prize challenge.

Phone Data Re-identification




Analysis of **“anonymized”**
phone data over 15 months.




Use of **only 4 points of**
reference with slight
differences in time and space.



Unique identification of 95%
out of 1.5 m users.



How Re-identification Works



Identifying **data in retained fields**, e.g., patient name mentioned in physician notes, a text field or graph structure match, even without labels



Combination of multiple partial identification, e.g., AOL search, Massachusetts health information



Using **external data sets**, e.g., Netflix

Four Types of Leakage

1

Reveal **identity**

3

Reveal **link between two entities**, e.g., by phone call metadata

2

Reveal **value of hidden attributes**

4

Reveal **group membership**, e.g., your religious denomination from your cellphone location

Anonymity Is Impossible

Anonymity is virtually **impossible**, with enough other data:

Diversity of entity sets can be eliminated through **joining external data**.


Random perturbation works only if we can **guarantee a one-time perturbation**.

Aggregation works only if there is **no known structure** among entities aggregated.

Faces can be recognized in image data. Increasingly even **under challenging conditions**, such as partial occlusion.

Severe Lack of Anonymity

Example: China's Facial Recognition



Limit Publication of Datasets As Solution?



If **anonymity is not possible**, the simplest way to prevent misuse is **not to publish a dataset**.



For example, **government** agencies should **not make potentially sensitive data public**.



Yet, access to **data is crucial for many desirable purposes**, including medical research and public watchdogs.

License Data to Trusted Parties

Need **simple licensing regime** for access to potentially sensitive data, including de-identified data.



Enforce through
contracts in the
business world or...



...through **professional
standards** in the
research world.



Identity is very hard to manage online.



Anonymity is possible only in limited narrow situations.



De-identification is important to deter the merely curious but will not stop the truly determined.